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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ARCHIE LEININGER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs.STEARNS-ROGER 1\IANUFACTURING COMPANY, a corporation; XYZ CO~IPANY, a corporation; X, Y and Z, a co-partnership,
DOES I through \r,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case
No.10193

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's Statement of Facts is replete with extraneous facts 'vhich tend to confuse the real legal relationship that existed bet,veen the parties to this action.
His statement glosses over the admitted undisputed facts
that were the basis for the District Court's Order for
Summary Judgment. The uncontroverted facts that Appellee bases its position are as follows :
In 1957, Stearns-Roger Manufacturing Company
completed its job at Mexican Hat, Utah, as the general
1
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contractor for the construction of the uranium reduction
mill for the App·ellant's employer, Texas-Zinc Minerals
Corporation. The contract for the construction of the
mill is in evidence (Plf. Ex 1) which delineates the relationship between Stearns-Roger and Texas-Zinc. The
contract contemplates that the Contractee will, in some
instances, specify certain items of equipment. Article
four ( 4) states as follows :
ARTICLE 4. CoNTRACTOR's DuTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES: This Contractor shall be responsible for the
execution and completion of the work in accordance with the provisions of this contract. The
Contractor undertakes to turn over to the
Company a completed uranium ore processing
plant and copper concentrating plant, including
appurtenances thereto and the said additional surface facilities, ready for operation in a manner
satisfactory to the Company; provided, however,
that the Contractor shall have no responsibility
for the a,dequacy of certa.in major items of equipment selected solely by the Compa.ny where the
sa.me are prop·erly installed and functioning in
a.ccorda;n.ce with the manufacturers' representations. (Emphasis supplied)
Appellant alleges that the accident in controversy
occurred on September 12, 1960, almost three (3) years
after Appellee had completed his job and almost four (4)
years after the fans in question 'vere made operable in
the assay lab. The Appellant, in the course of his employment with Texas-Zinc, 'Yas injured in the dismantling of a. Duriron Fan.
The fans in controversy 'vere selected by the Contractee, Texas-Zinc's chemist, Robert Louis 1\tiaurice, Jr.
2
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The uncontroverted fa.c.ts sho·w· that Mr. ~1aurice was
on the job site prior to the completion of the construction
and instructed Appellee to procure the particular fans.
Mr. ~fa.urice testified during his deposition (Depo. of
Robert Lewis Maurice, Jr., pp. 2, 3 and 4), as follows:

Q. And what is your occupation~
A. Chief Chemist.
Q.
A.

Forwhom~

Texas-Zinc ~iinerals Corporation.

Q. And is that at ~iexican Hat, Utah~
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And how long have you been engaged in that
occupation~

A.

Sinee the first of September, 1956.

Q.

Now I understand you are a graduate chemist,
is that right~
A. I have a Bachelor of Science Degree in
chemistry.

Q. And 'vhat did you tell me that your position is
with Texa.s-Zinc ~
A. Chief Chemist.
Q. And how long have you had that position~
A. Well, ever since September the 1st, 1956. I
would have to count it and see, little over five
years.
Q. Were you here at the time of the construction
of the plant~
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And during the construction of the plan yon
observed, of course, the construction and the
3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

facilities which 'vere · placed in the chemical
laboratory building, didn't you¥
A. Yes, sir.

Q. And did you have anything to do 'vith the determination or selection of any of the materials that were installed within the plant within the chemical laboratory¥
A. Within the chem lab, yes.
Q. To what extent would that amount to~
A. Practically all of it.
Did you have anything to do with these exhaust fans?
A.. Yes, sir, I did.

Q.

Q. And what was that, Mr. Maurice¥
A. Well, I guess the best way to put it is that
I :gave specifications which were to - for
these fans, what they were supposed to do.
Q.

Can you tell generally what those specifications were~
A. Well, the specifications were at the time that I
gave the specifications - actually I sent
Stearns-Roger to Lucius Pitkin A. E. C. laboratory in Grand Junction and told them that
I wanted the same installation that they had
there.

Q. Did yon know the nature of the exhaust fans
they had at Lucius Pitkin f
A. I knew that they were the Duriron Fans.
Subsequent to the deposition of !Ir. Maurice, on the
18th day of ~lay, 1962, Requests for Admission of Facts
were framed and submitted to the Appellant, on October
4
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15, 1962 (R. 26 and 27). The initial question presented
was:
Does plaintiff admit that the Duriron Exhaust
Fans referred to in Plaintiff's Complaint were selected by Mr. Robert Maurice, ''Chief Chemist''
of the Texas-Zinc Minerals Corporation~
Appellant answered on the 9th day of November,
1962, by denying said request. On the 22nd day of April,
1964, Appellee submitted the follo,ving Interrogatory to
Plaintiff, Archie Leininger (R. 98):
1. In defendant's Request for Admission of
Facts served on plaintiff, prior to this date, the
plaintiff denied that the Duriron Exhaust Fans referred to in Plaintiff's Complaint were selected by
l\tlr. Robert Maurice, Chief Chemist of the TexasZinc Mineral Corporation. In light of said answer, state all fact or facts, concerning the selection of the Duriron Exhaust Fans. In connection 'vith this Interrogatory, but not limiting yourself, state who selected said fans, the date that
said fans were selected and any and all facts that
you have at your disposal that neg·a.tes the testimony of Robert Lewis Maurice, as testified by
him on pages three and four of his disposition taken on the 18th day of ~lay, 1962.
Appellant ans,vered said Interrogatory by admitting
the fact that lVlr. Maurice selected said fans on the 1st day
of May, 1964 (R. 104). The deposition of Mr. ~iauric0
showed that he had experience 'vith Duriron Fans prior
to the time that he made his selection and that he made
his choice based upon his past experience in working in
assay labs.
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In the Appellant's Statement of Facts much time
is presented showing that this particular type of fan of
Duriron 's "\Vas involved in many explosions. There is not
one scintilla of evidence, however, that any explosion
occurred involving these particular fans prior to the date
that Mr. Maurice designated the fan in question. All
explosions occurred subsequent to this date; and Appellant's evidence, therefore, shows that this type of fan
was generally considered safe and proper by the industry
and, further, was widely used in the industry.
It is admitted that after the fans were selected by
Mr. Maurice, they 'vere received from the manufacturer
fully assembled (Plaintiff's answer to Interrogatory No.
2, R. 104-105). Therefore, the only act performed by
Stearns-Roger in the "installation" was to place these
fans, "\vhich were fully assembled, in the space allocated
for them in the laboratory.
Plaintiff's theory concerning the accident in question was that the sealing compound contained a certain
chemical mixture that caused the fans to explode when
the Appellant was disassembling the same during the
course of maintenance of said fans. The evidence shows
that Appellee, Stearns-Roger, had no knowledge of the
propensity of these particular fans to explode and had
reeeived no information of the same until after the commencement of this la'v suit (R. 112). However, TexasZinc was 'vell aware of this propensity (Depo. of Robert
Lewis Maurice, pp. 7 and 8).
Notwithstanding this
knowledge, Texas-Zinc instructed and directed the plain6
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tiff to dismantle this fan. Though plaintiff denies that
he was 'varned of any particular problem, there is no
doubt that Texas-Zinc "\vas cognizant of the fact that
these fans had exploded in the past.

ARGU~1ENT

POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY RULED
THAT THE DEFENDANT CONTRACTOR
WAS NOT LIABLE FOR THE WORK AFTER
COMPLETION AND ACCEPTANCE BY
TEXAS-ZINC ..
There is much confusion in judicial decision on
whether or not a contractor is insulated from liability
for his negligence to a third person after acceptance of
the job by the contractee. These diverse opinions are set
forth in 58 ALR 2d, p. 847.
It is Appellee's position, that the la'v in the State
of Utah, is settled by the companion cases of Berg v. Otis
Elevator Comparn.y, 64 Utah 518, 231 Pac. 832, and Sutton v. Otis Elevator Company, 68 Utah 85, 249 Pac. 437.
Some jurisdictions, as Appellant has pointed out, ha.Yc
extended the MacPherson doctrine to building contractors and there has been many decisions criticizing the
insulation theory as being antiquated and outmoded.
The Berg and Sutton cases, supra, that appellant is asking this Court to overturn, however, do not hold for this
so-called outmoded doctrine. The Berg and Sutton cases
state that a contractor may be liable to third persons if
certain conditions are met. It should be pointed out,

7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

therefore, that 've need not make an ''Assault Upon the
Citadel" in disposing of this matter.
The fact situation in this case is radically different
that the ''normal'' contractor-contractee-third person relationship. The Duriron Fan which exploded was not
selected by the Contractor. The choice of this fan was
the Contractee 's. Appellant has cited no case, nor can
any be found, that would place a duty on a contractor of
examining the contractee 's choice of equipment and arbitrarily rejecting the same. The Appellant's position is
one of asserting a duty on the contractor, after being instructed by the contractee to furnish a particular item of
equipment from a reputable manufacturer, to tear down
and completely disassemble the item of equipment; and
the further duty of running a chemical test of the ingredients of a cement-like sealing compound.
As stated above, the Berg and Sutton cases do not
hold that a contractor is completely immune from liability after the acceptance of the job by the contractee.
These cases state that under certain circumstances the
contractor may be held liable for injuries to third persons. The Berg and Sutton cases recognizes, however,
the basic distinction between a contractor and a manufacturer of chattels. This distinction is pointed out in
13 ALR 2d p. 196 :
Thus, a manufacturer or processor of articles
in manufacturing or processing the same does not
ordinarily act as a contractor with the intermediate dealer, and the articles are not usually prepared according to specifications prescribed by
the intermediate dealer, \vhereas a building or

8
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construction contractor frequently undertakes to
construct the thing contracted for with the contractee according to the latter's specifications. In
such case the contractee knows, or is presumed to
lmow, that the structure contracted for is likely
to result in injury or damage to third persons, and
the contractor may not ordinarily be expected to
question the safety and soundness of his contractee 's specifications or plans for the work.
There is, therefore, found in the relation of the
contractor and the contractee elements laeking in
the relation of a manufacturer and intermediate
dealer ·w·hich 'vould "~arrant the application of the
doctrine of proximate cause in such a way as to
connect the injury more closely to the negligence
of the contractee in exposing third persons to the
danger of faulty specifications and separate it
from the contractor's original negligence in constructing the dangerous structure. This difference is in some cases recognized in judicial opinions (see Travis v. Rochester Bridge Co. (1919)
188 Ind. 79, 122 NE 1) ....
The Berg and Sutton cases hold that in order to hold
the contractor liable, the plaintiff must affirmatively
prove- three (3) elements. First, the plaintiff must show
that the contractor had reason to kno·w· about the dangerously instrumentality. Secondly, that the contractee
could not, and did not, discover the defect. Thirdly, it
must be proved that the contractor had knowledge of the
dangerous condition.

POINT II.
THE LOWER COURT PRO PERL·~f RUIJED
THAT DEFENDANT STEARNS WAS NOT
LIABI_JE BECAUSE THE FAN WAS SELECT9
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ED BY AND FURNISHED AT THE REQUEST
OF TEXAS-ZINC, PLAINTIFF'S El\1PLOYER.
The defendant Stearns-Roger relied at the pre-trial,
when the 1fotion for Summary Judgment was heard, and
now heavily relies upon the uncontroverted facts that
Contractee-Owner requested the Dnriron Fan and that
the same was delivered fully assembled. The only way
that Stearns could have discovered the defect 'vas to disassemble the fan, ''despite the fact that litharge and
glycerine hardened to a cement-like compound upon setting" (Appellant's Statement of Facts, p. 8), and run a
chemical analysis of the sealing compound. For the purpose of Stearn's Motion for Summary Judgment, it was
admitted that a chemical mixture existed in the sealing
compound, which, after the accumulation of time, would
be unsafe. There 'vas no practical "\vay, ho,vever, for
Stearns to have discovered this fact.
Even in those jurisdictions which haYe adopted the
so-called ''modern view'' as to the responsibility of contractors to third persons, there is a unanimity of decisions holding that a building contractor is not liable if
he follows the plans and specifications furnished him by
the owner-contractee. 13 Ani Jur. 2d, Section 140, page
131, states :
Section 140. Rule of liability 'vhere negligent
'vork reasonably certain to endanger third persons.
In a number of recent cases, the courts have
expressed their dissatisfaction with the process
of beginning 'vith the above rule of nonliability
and then follo,Ying it through the emasculating
exceptions to the rule, and have favored a

10
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more direct approach. Instead of applying the
rule of nonliability and its exceptions, these
courts have established the rule that a building or construction contractor is liable for injuries to or the death of third persons, occurring
after the acceptance of the completed 'vork by the
contractee, \vhere the \vork is reasonably certain
to endanger third persons if negligently prepared
or constructed. This vie'v is based on recognition
of the fact that there are no sufficient grounds for
a differentiation between the liability for negligence of a. manufacturer of goods and that of a
building or construction contractor, and the decisions supporting this Yiew are, in fact or effect,
an application of the rule governing the liability
of manufacturers to ultimate consumers for defective products. The liability of a buildi1z,g contractor under this rule is not absolttle, howecer, but is
predicated on negligence, and thus a contractor
follotvin,g pla.ns and specifications given to him,
and which a reasonable man tvould follou~, is not
liable for injuries resulting from the structure.
(Emphasis supplied)
This Yiew is also sustained in 58 .A.LR2d 891-898 which
plaintiff cites as the annotation supporting his position,
at page 893, Section 53 (d) the editor speaks as follo,vs:
(d) Effect of rule.
The adaption of the modern view in eases involving building or construction contractors has
the effect of applying to them the ].1ae-Pherson
rule. It does not have the effect of making the
contractor absolutely liable to third persons 'vithout negligence.
Thus, it \vas stated in Russell Y. Arthur 'Vhitcomb, Inc. (1956) 100 NH 171, 121 A2d 781, that
one important limitation on the rule placing build11
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ing contractors on the same footing as sellers of
goods, and holding them to the general standard
of reasonable care for the protection of anyonf
"~ho may foreseeably be endangered by their negligence even after acceptance of the work, is that
the contractor is not liable if he has merely carried
out the plans, specifications, and directions given
him, since in that ca.se the responsibility is assumed by the employer, at least when the plans
are not so obviously dangerous that no reasonable man would follo'v them.
For an application of this principle, see Person v. Cauld,vell-Wingale Co. (1951. CA2d NY)
187 F2d 832, cert den 341 US 936, 95 L ed 1364, 71
S Ct 855, infra, & 61.
Prosser on Torts (2d Edition), Section 85, p. 519 states:
It appears, however, that the analogy of l\IacPherson Y. Buick l\1otor Co., is at last being accepted. Several recent decisions have placed
building contractors on the same footing as sellers of goods, and have held them to the general
standard of reasonable care for the protection of
anyone who may foreseeably be endangered by the
negligence, even after acceptanee of the work. One
important limitation recognized in several cases
is that the contractor is not liable if he has merely
carried out carefully the plans, specifications and
directions given him, since in that case the responsibility is assumed by the employer, at least
where the plans are not so obviously dangerous
that no reasonable man 'vould follo·w· them.
The follo""ing cases sustain the proposition that a
contractor is not liable if he follo"~s plans and specifieations, and subsequent}~~ it appears that said plans and
specifications ma)r ha Ye been defective.

12
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John.son. v. City of San. Learndro, 179 Cal Ap·p2d 794,
4 Cal Rptr 404 (1960); Loesch v R. P. Farn.sworth & Co.,.
12So2d 222, (La App 1943); Romwno v RossOIYto Const.
Co., 341 Mass 718, 171 NE2d 853 (1961); Trustees of the
First Baptist Church v McElroy, 223 Miss 327, 78 So2d
138 (1955); Lydecker v Board of Chosen Freeholders, 91
NJL. 622, 103 A 251 (1918); Tiplon v Clower, 67 NM 388,
356 P2d 46 (1960); Rubin v Girard Trust Co., 154 Pa
Super 257, 35 A2d 601 (1944); Belk v J. A. Const. Co.,
272 F2d 394 (6th Cir (Tenn) 1959); Thornton v Dow, 60
Wash 622, 111 P 899 (1910); Inma;n v Bin,ghamto~~ Housing Authority, 1 AD2d 599, 152 NYS 2d 79 (1956), rev'd
on other grounds, 3 NY2d 137, 164 NYS2d 699, 143 NE2d
895, (1957), 59 ALR2d 1072 (1958); Ryan v Feeney & 8.
Bldg. Co., 239 NY 43, 145 NE 321 41 ALR 1; Russel v Arthur Whitcomb, Inc., 100 NH 171, 121 A2d 781.
Stearns admits Appellant's statement that "it did
not perform any other test ... " {Appellant's Statement
of Facts, p. 6) and therefore, the issue presented is what
duty did Searns have in pe-rforming tests that would
have detected the alleged defect. Appellant cites no authority that requires Stearns to make tests but rather
cites the analogy of the duties of a ''Supplier of Chattels" by citing Section 402 of the Restatement of Tort~.
Stearns can not be considered a supplier of chattel~.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note what the Restatement feels is the duty of a supplier to test. Section 402
originally read as follows :
§ 402 Duty to Inspect Chattel.

A vendor of a chattel manufactured by a third
13
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person is subject to liability as stated in § 399, if,
although he is ignorant of the dangerous character
or condition of the chattel, he could have discovered it by exercising reasonable care to utilize the
peculiar opportunity and competence which as a
dealer in such chattels he has or should have.
If one was to assume that we were in the position of
a ''Supplier of Chattels,'' then perhaps we may be under
an obligation to test the fan based on the above rule in
that the phrase ''Could Have Discovered It'' might giYe
this connotation.
Because of this problem Section 402 'vas revised in
the 1948 Supplement and states as follows:
§ 402.

DuTY To INSPECT CHATTEL.

A
vendor of a chattel manufactured by a third person, who neither knows nor has reason to know
that it is, or is likely to be, dangerous, is not subject to liability for harm caused by the dangerous
character or condition of the chattel even though
he could have discoYered it by an inspection or
test of the chattel before selling it.
ABSENCE OF DuTY TO INSPECT CHATTEL.

The editor makes some germane points on the need
for the revision 'vhich clearly shows the Plaintiff's unrealistic position in this ease at page 716 as follow'"S:
Comment:
a. For the meaning of ''reason to kno"~'' see
§§ 12(1) and 401, Comment a. The dangerous
character or condition of the chattel, in the circumstances stated in this section, is not a fact
which the vendor ''should kno"'T'' as those 'vords
are defined in § 12(2).
14
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b. There is a clear distinction between the liability of a manufacturer and that of a vendor for
harm caused by a chattel made by the former and
sold by the latter. The manufacturer of a dangerously defective chattel is the ereator of something
which is foreseeably dangerous when it is used for
the purpose for which it is manufactured. The
constructing of the chattel defectively, "\vith
knowledge it is to be sent out to be used, is an
unreasonably dangerous activity. On the other
hand, the vendor who reasonably believes that the
chattel he is selling is safe for use is not, in selling and delivering the chattel, doing anything
'vhich is foreseea bly likely to cause harm. The
slight risk inherent in the possibility the chattel
may be defective is not sufficient to constitute an
unreasonable risk. The burden on the vendor of
requiring him to inspeet chattels he reasonably believes to be free from hidden danger outweighs
the magnitude of the risk that a particular chattel
may be dangerously defective (See ~~ 291-293}.
Negligence is determined in the light of the facts
known to the actor (See~ 282, Comment g).
The editor goes on to state the reason for the change
was occasioned by semantical confusion and states at
page 718 the following:
... At the time these Sections were originally
drafted, no decision of any Court of last resort in
England or America had ever held that a vendor
had a duty to inspect chattels before selling them.
The only decision by an intermediate court "\VaH
Garvey v. Namm, 2d Dept. 1910, 121 N1TS 422
136 App. Div. 815. In that case, a divided court
held that the plaintiff, who had purchased a r>9c
wrapper at a department store sale, and "\Vho ,vas
scratched by a basting needle left in an unfinishe<l
seam, could recover from a vendor for harm re-
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ceived "'"hen scratched by the needle. That decision seems to be ridiculous on its facts. What
''reasonable man" 'vould think it necessary to inspect meticulously every one of a thousand cheap
wrappers before putting them on sale 1 In 1940
the same Court follo,ved this decision in Santise
v. l\Iartins, Inc., 2d Dept. 1940, 17 NYS 2c1 741,
258 App. Div. 663, and held that a plaintiff, 'vho
was injured by a nail protruding from the inner
sole of a shoe he was trying on in a. department
store, could recover from that store. This decision also seems indefensible. vVha t ''reasonable
man'' operating a shoe store 'vould consider the
sales of shoes unreasonably dangerous 'vithout
carefully palpating the inside of every shoe before
selling it 1 It is doubtful that even a manufacturer
of garments is required to make a minute inspection ''for the purpose of discovering 'vhether a
basting needle has not been left in a. seam.'' Restatement, Torts, ~ 395, Comment a ....
The Reporter believes the majority rule ~s
sound and is desirable. Once a duty of inspection
is recognized to exist, it is most difficult as a practical matter to determine 'vhat must be done to
fulfill it. What does "observable defect" mean?
Observable from 'vhat angle and under what conditions~ Is the defect any less discoverable, if,
though not "observable,'' it can be found by· tasting, smelling, hearing or feeling the chattel~ Must
a handy hammer be used to tap the chattel; or a
handy piece of litmus paper used to test it~ And
if so, where do we end, other than in a modern
testing laboratory to which eYery country store
and retail shop must go f
Therefore, it clearly appears, that even if Stearns-Roger's role 'vas that of a "Supplier of Chattels'' there ",.as
no obligation for him to test the fans in question.
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POINT III
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY RULED
THAT THE KNOWLEDGE OF TEXAS-ZINC
OF PRIOR EXPLOSIONS AND THE HAZARDOUS NATURE OF THE FAN WAS THE
INTERVENING CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT.
The deposition of Robert Le,vis Maurice, Jr., the
Chief Chemist of Texas-Zinc, clearly shows that TexasZinc., the Plaintiff's employer, had prior knowledg·e of
the propensity of the fans to explode. }fr. l\{aurice testified as follows (Depo. of Robert Le,vis Maurice, pp.
8 and. 9):
· ·,

A. Yes, sir. It seems to me that this thing
came up and actually the person at Lucius Pitkin
who was originally hurt up there that I hea.rd
about was Warren Bush, Chief Chemist, whom I.
know quite well, and I either called him or talked
to someone who was down here at the time and it
seems to me that the drive side of the fan wa.s
mentioned, that this. explosion occurred in the
packing. Now I knew that the packing on the intakeside of the fan, which was to be worked on,
. was composed of nothing more than asbestos and
that there was no danger there at all.

Appellant has cited authority that the knowledge
of the contract owner is not the intervening cause. It is
Appellee's position that this question is settled in Utah
by the Berg v. Otis Elevator case, supra., and the ~9utfon
v. Otis Elevator case, supra. In Berg v. Otis Elevator
Company, the Court states that the plaintiff must prove,
as a necessary element, in order to hold the contractor
liable, that the contract o'vner had no kno,vledge of the
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defect. The case states, at page 835 of the Pacific
Reporter:
4. The decided \veight of authority supports
the proposition that "~hen an independent ,contractor has done work on an instrumentality nnd
by his "\vork makes the instrumentality imminently
dangerous to those he kne""'" \vould use it, he remains liable, even after the completion of his \vork
and its aceeptance by the contractee, to third parties injured as the result of his negligence if the
contractor kne\v or in viewr of the peculiar circumstances of the case should have kno,vn the dangerous condition by him created, and the C01ltractee had no knowledge of the dangerous condition or defect which was so concealed that reasonable insp·ection by the contractee would not ha.ve
discovered it ... (Emphasis supplied)

Justice Thurman, in Sutton v. Otis Elevator Comparn.y, again articulated this principle, and states on page
448 of the Pacific Reporter:
(11) But it is contended that, in any event,
knowledge of the contractee of the danger created
by the contractor is matter of defense only; that it
is not incumbent upon plaintiff to prove "rant of
knowledge as an element of liability. I am of
opinion that it is an element of liability, under the
Gertrude Berg decision, and cases therein cited.
It is also suggested that to require plaintiff,
in a case of this kind, to make proof of a. contrartee's \Vant of kno,vledge might he inconvenient
and in many cases bar recovery. It is not an
unusual thing for litigants in court to fail for
"Ta.nt of proof. However, no one should desire the
establishment of a rule that "rould seriously hamper either a plaintiff or a defendant in obtaining
evidenee to establish his cause of action or de-
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fense. It seems, ho,vever, that the solicitude manifested for fear a plaintiff in this kind of case may
not be able to obtain proof of the eontractee's
'vant of knowledge is without substantial foundation. In the very nature of the case the plaintiff
will usually have the sympathy, good will, and
assistance of the contractee, as in the ease at bar,
for the reason that the eontractee, who is usually
liable in any event, 'viii be vitally interested in establishing the contractor's liability, hoping thereby to establish a cause of action in his own favor
against his contractor, whose negligence may have
caused the injury.
This view is also supported by Dean Prosser (Prosser on Torts 2nd Edition, Section 85, page 519).
One important limitation recognized in several
cases is that the contractor is not liable if he has
merely carried out carefully the plans, specifications, and directions given him since in that case
the responsibility is assumed by the employer, at
least where the plans are not so obviously dangerous that no reasonable man 'vould follow them.
In the only cases that have been found on the
point, it has been held that the employer's failure
to discover the defect will not relieve the contractor of liability; but that if he discot·ers the
darnger, or it is obvious to him, his responsibility
supersedes that of the contractor." (Emphasi~
supplied)
In accord: Goar v. Village of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228,
196 N.W. 171; Price v. Johnston Cotton Con~pany of
Windell, 226 N.C. 758, 40 S.E. 2d 344; H owa.rd v. Rein.hart and Donovarn Co., 196 Okl. 506, 166 P. 2d 110.
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POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN R.EFUSING TO SUBMIT THE CASE TO THE
JURY ON THE THEORY OF A BREACH OF
WARRANTY.
The warranty theory produced by plaintiff has no
substance. The cases cited by him refer to a different
factual situation, than the case at hand. There was no
sale of fans from Stearns-Roger to Texas-Zinc, and
Stearns-Roger can not be considered a ''Supplier of
Chattels.' '
POINT V
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING PLAINTIFF'S EX. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12.
The accident in question occurred on or about the
12th day of September, 1960. The exhibits in question
are all dated during the year 1962. They have no materiality in this case. For the purpose of Summary
Judgment, it "~as admitted that there "~as a chemical mixture in the sealing compound that caused the accident in
controversy. The issue in this case, ho"rever, is ho'v
Stearns-Roger, or anyone else, could have knowledge of
that fact. The Appellant tendered these exhibits to
show knowledge of Stearns-Roger of the propensity of
the fans to explode. Obviously, kno"~ledge of the industry two (2) years st1bsequent to the aeciclent, and
six (6) years after installation is totally immaterial.
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POINT VI
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN
GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Appellee does not disagrHe with the authorities cited
by Appellant as to the requirement that a Motion for
Summary Judgment should not be granted if there is a
genuine issue a.s to a material fact. There is no issue.
The admitted facts are:
1. The selection of the fans was made by Texas-Zinc.
2. The fans came fully assembled.
3. The alleged cause of the accident was the sealing
compound in the fans.

CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff cannot sustain a cause of action as to
the Defendant, and Plaintiff's remedy, if any, lies
against the Duriron Company.

Respectfully Submitted,

ELTON AND l\fOORE
510 American Oil Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Defen.da;ntResp,on.dent, Stearns-Roger
JJfanufa:ctur·ing ComrJa.ny
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